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Abstract: Traceability is becoming a condition for doing business in European food 
markets. Retailers are adopting standards that are more stringent than what is mandatory. 
An example is EurepGAP, a quality standard for good agricultural practices that includes 
traceability as a main requirement. We analyze EurepGAP implementation in the 
Portuguese pear industry and find that implementation cannot be distinguished from sales 
to British supermarkets. Discrete choice models show the odds of traceability adoption 
increase with farm size and previous compliance with quality assurance schemes, while 
farm productivity has a negative impact on the probability of adoption. 
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   1 
Traceability Adoption at the Farm Level: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Portuguese Pear Industry 
 
Traceability adoption is becoming a condition for doing business in European food 
markets. A variety of traceability systems associated with quality assurance systems 
coexist. Some are private initiatives while others are public (Sterns, Codron, and 
Reardon). Mandatory traceability was first established in the beef sector through 
European Union (EU) Commission and Parliament regulations 1760/2000 and 
1825/2000. Then EU regulation 178/2002 established new food laws and imposed 
traceability on all foods destined for human consumption. Traceability is defined in 
article 3 as the "ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or 
substance intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed, through, all 
stages of production, processing, and distribution" (p. 8). While this regulation is clear 
about the need to establish a path of information across food supply chains, it is vague on 
what types of information have to be shared and about system requirements and 
characteristics. 
As more stringent food regulations have been put forth by public authorities, the 
private sector, namely retailers, have been implementing their own standards responding 
to growing consumer demand for safer food (Giraud-Héraud, Hammoudi and Soler). 
Since voluntary traceability is typically associated with quality assurance systems, it is 
almost impossible to distinguish the motivation for traceability adoption from the 
decision to comply with a quality standard. However, traceability is not a requirement of 
every current quality assurance system.    2 
While there are studies on the demand for traceability (see for example Hobbs et 
al.), empirical studies on the supply of traceability and why firms adopt it are still scarce. 
This paper’s objective is to employ econometric methods to analyze traceability adoption 
at the farm level, using the Portuguese pear industry as a case study. Fruit producers in 
the area northwest of Lisbon are organized in cooperatives and other types of 
organizations. Many of them have been exporting to British supermarkets chains for the 
past decade. Starting in 2000, the producer organizations were pressured to adopt 
EurepGAP (Euro Retailer Produce Working Group Good Agricultural Practices) 
certification. While the number of farmers certified by EurepGAP is increasing, the 
majority as yet have not adopted this quality standard. As a result, they may be prevented 
from exporting to the more profitable British market.  
This paper starts with a discussion of the motivations for traceability in food 
chains, a brief description of the EurepGAP quality assurance. Then we present 
theoretical and empirical models of adoption at the farm level. Following we describe 
Western region of Portugal and the methodology we used to gather the data. The final 
sections include a discussion of the results and concluding remarks. 
Motivations for Traceability Adoption 
Firms have a variety of motivations to adopt traceability. For example, Meuwissen et al. 
identify the following benefits in the beef sector: increased transparency, reduced 
exposure to liability, improved effectiveness of recalls, enhanced logistics, improved 
control of livestock epidemics, easier product licensing, and a price premium. Since 
traceability reduces levels of information asymmetry, it may decrease transaction costs   3 
thus increasing trust levels and facilitating contracting. Golan et al. surveyed several 
traceability systems in the US agro-food industries. They found that systems varied 
widely across industries and depending upon motivations for implementation.  
In a study of traceability adoption in the European meat and poultry sectors, Buhr 
found that the main drivers are: larger production uncertainty; higher chances of moral 
hazard and opportunistic behavior; increasing quality monitoring costs; and the inability 
to identify traits. Goldsmith discusses how to impose a flow of information in grain 
supply chains. He argues that producers, processors, and retailers have different 
valuations of information, which may prevent traceability adoption. This occurs because 
while the producers would expect to receive a premium, processors and retailers may not 
be willing to offer one. However, retailers or processors will seek to develop and enforce 
contracts for traceability with their suppliers when they are faced with consumer 
willingness to pay for it or opportunities for risk mitigation through traceability. 
Research to date on motivations for traceability adoption in food supply chains 
has been collected mainly using case study methodology. In recent years, however, there 
has been attempt to develop a better empirical understanding of traceability 
implementation. Soldano and Verneau, for example, conducted a series of interviews 
with managers in the Italian tomato processing industry. Their preliminary results suggest 
that 33 per cent of the firms interviewed have adopted traceability. The reported benefits 
from traceability are improved food safety, stronger consumer warranties, increased 
supply chain management efficiencies, and potential competitive advantages. These 
benefits may increase with the size of the firm.    4 
Analyzing the impact of mandatory traceability in the Italian beef supply chain, 
Mora and Menozzi surveyed breeding farms and processing industries focusing on the 
cost components and cost drivers of traceability. Their survey of 15 slaughterhouses 
revealed that scale and previous adoption of traceability provide a competitive edge to 
firms. The results also indicate the existence of complementarities with both HACCP and 
ISO 9002 certification, i.e. traceability is less costly when firms are already complying 
with a quality assurance scheme. Moreover, while traceability raised costs across the 
board, these costs were perceived differently depending upon the size of the firm. They 
found that the costs of traceability appear to be larger for medium sized firms. Meat 
processors transforming less than 10,000 head per year had a traceability cost of 1.5 to 2 
euros per metric ton, while those transforming more than 50,000 head per year had costs 
of 1 Euro per metric ton. Medium size firms, processing between 10,000 and 50,000 head 
per year, faced costs of traceability per head of 2.5 to 3.5 euros. In terms of the total 
production costs, traceability costs varied from 1.5 and 4 percent depending upon the size 
of the firm. The benefits reported by respondents were grouped into three categories: 
reduction of internal defects, reduction of external defects, and strategic advantages. 
Finally the authors analyze how a retailer (COOP Italia) is using contracts to force its 
suppliers to implement a more stringent traceability system. This system is 
complementary to a quality assurance system seeking to differentiate quality beef. This 
traceability system uses computer technologies to provide information to consumers. 
Banterle, Stranieri, and Baldi carried out another empirical analysis relating 
traceability and transaction costs in the Italian meat processing supply chain. They   5 
administrated a questionnaire to determine how traceability changed key transaction 
factors and costs in firms certified under UNI 10939, an Italian quality standard. The 
results are based on a subsample of 32 meat processing firms. Using a combination of 
multivariate analysis procedures (factor, cluster, and principal components analysis) they 
found three clusters with diverse impacts of traceability on vertical coordination. 
Voluntary traceability had a bigger impact on contractual relations, especially for small 
firms that no longer have to rely on informal relationships to choose partners. Larger 
firms also reported a reorganization of their supply chain management strategies. 
However, this reorganization was less extensive because they had previously adopted 
quality assurance system that facilitated traceability adoption. In terms of risk 
management, the results show that while small firms avoid risk of contractual 
infringements through contracts, larger firms use price incentives to reduce opportunistic 
behavior. Overall the authors found traceability adoption created benefits through 
improved information flow, reinforcement of trust, and the assignment of liability across 
the supply chain. 
To date there are few empirical studies of traceability adoption in the fruit and 
vegetables industries. In 2000, the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group, which is 
associates the largest Northern European retailers, created EurepGAP. Adopted by all the 
affiliated companies, EurepGAP is a common generic standard for good agricultural 
practices. In 2001, this standard became mandatory for suppliers of fruit and vegetables 
to Eurep affiliated retailers. In 2003 it was extended to include meats. The EurepGAP 
standard is reviewed every three years. The 2004 version includes a checklist of 214   6 
major and minor obligations, and recommendations (EurepGAP). Traceability is the first 
of 49 major obligations. 
Fresh produce is a strategic asset for most retail operations. Sterns, Codron, and 
Reardon used a series of in-depth interviews with quality assurance and marketing 
managers in the leading German and British supermarket chains to study the EurepGAP 
quality assurance system in the produce sector. They report that the proliferation of 
quality assurance systems is mainly driven by retailers due to their market power from 
concentration, role as the consumer's gatekeeper, and comparative advantages in 
logistics. Industry quality standards such as EurepGAP seem to be leading to a private 
consensus on how to define, manage, and impose higher quality and safety standards 
along the supply chain.  
Increasing consumer concern about food safety and the environment have led the 
larger retailing operators in the EU such as Marks and Spencer in Great Britain and 
Carrefour in France to propose their own independent quality assurance schemes. These 
often have more stringent requirements than are included in public regulations (Giraud-
Héraud, Hammoudi and Soler). Giraud-Héraud, Hammoudi and Soler model the impact 
of industry wide private quality assurance systems such as EurepGAP and conclude that 
they may lead to a reduction in contracting and a return to spot-markets. 
Peris and Juliá compare the costs of production under EurepGAP and standard 
practices in the citrus industry of the Valencia Region in Spain. The production costs 
evaluation is carried out using a full costing methodology that accounts for variable, 
fixed, and opportunity costs. However, opportunity costs could not be included in the   7 
estimation due to a lack of data. The results were based on the analysis of nine plots 
cultivated with two different varieties of oranges. The average sum of variable and fixed 
costs of production under EurepGAP totaled 2,388.19 euros per hectare for the plots 
considered. The variable costs accounted for over 60 percent of the total and varied 
significantly across plots. Even after accounting for the higher certification costs of 
EurepGAP, production under EurepGAP was found to be less costly than the 
conventional production system in the region. The conventional system had an average 
cost of 0.13 euros per kilo of oranges compared to a cost of 0.11 euros per kilo under 
EurepGAP. 
Souza Monteiro and Caswell propose a model of voluntary traceability adoption 
that reflects the food supply chain under EurepGAP certification. The model has three 
firms linked vertically in a supply chain. The downstream 3
rd tier firm, having buyer 
power, decides to implement a farm to fork traceability system, motivated by consumer 
demand and stochastic losses from inadequate food safety assurance. A contract for 
traceability provision is offered to an upstream 2
nd tier firm. To assure participation, the 
contract specifies a level of traceability and a corresponding premium. In turn, the 2nd 
tier firm, assumed to also have buyer power over farmers, proposes a contract to assure 
their participation in the traceability system. If participation and incentive compatibility 
constraints are met, an efficient level of traceability, seen as a flow of information 
throughout the supply chain, can be achieved. 
Empirical studies of factors that affect traceability adoption can be conducted 
with discrete choice models, such as those applied to the analysis of new technologies or   8 
agricultural practices. Traceability can be thought of as a new process to share 
information with partners. A related case is the introduction of information technologies, 
as analyzed by Huffman and Mercier, who study the adoption of microcomputer 
technologies at the farm level. They analyzed data gathered through surveys of farmers 
using multinomial logistic models to derive the results. Results show that education and 
farm structure have the largest impact on the probability of adoption. In their extensive 
study of farm organization, Allen and Lueck provide both theoretical and empirical 
evidence of contracting in agriculture. They seek to demonstrate how transaction costs 
are prevalent in agriculture and influence the terms of contracts. The decision to take a 
contract is discrete in most of the circumstances they analyze. They use either logistic or 
ordinary least squares regressions to obtain their results. 
Here a similar data analysis methodology is followed using probabilistic models. 
The model will analyze the probability that a producer is certified by EurepGAP as the 
dependent variable, which is a proxy for implementation of a traceability system. This is 
regressed, through different Logit specifications, on a set of variables indicating farmer 
and farm characteristics. 
A Model of Traceability Adoption 
Traceability is a supply chain problem; it implies a flow of information through all firms 
involved in the production, processing, and distribution of food. Traceability can be 
imposed by governmental agencies, processors or retailers with market power in the 
supply chain, or both. Food regulation is forcing firms supplying EU food markets to 
implement traceability systems. As noted above, these regulations can be broadly   9 
interpreted and it is possible to adjust the types of system to the needs of a particular 
industry or supply chain. 
Our model of the decision to adopt traceability at the farm level assumes a farmer 
maximizes total profits (Π
T). It obtains profits (π) from selling output; these profits are an 
increasing and concave function of traceability. This captures the opportunities offered in 
export markets where traceability is a requisite. Farmers obtain a premium (p) assumed to 
be linear in traceability levels. Implementing traceability is costly with variable and fixed 
costs, represented respectively by c
v and c
f. Since the literature suggests that the size of 
the farm matters, as it may lessen the burden of investments in traceability, we introduce 
the parameter α to account for farm size. The decision to adopt traceability (γ) by a 
farmer is the solution to the following problem: 
2
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The necessary condition for profit maximization implicitly defines the optimal choice of 
traceability given by: 
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Where π’ is the first derivative of the output profit function with respect to the 
traceability level. This says that the level of traceability offered by a farmer is defined 
where benefits from marginal output profitability and the traceability premium equal its 
marginal costs. In the equation, the sufficient condition is verified; hence by the implicit 
function theorem the necessary condition defines the optimal level of traceability chosen 
by the farmer.  10 
The optimal level of traceability is impacted by changes in the parameters of the 
model, i.e., p, c
v, c
f, and α. Table 1 summarizes these effects and their expected signs 
under several testable hypotheses. First, the probability of adopting traceability increases 
with the amount of the premium. Second, the larger are the fixed and variable costs of 
implementing traceability, the lesser are the chances of traceability being implemented. 
Third, larger farms are hypothesized to a better opportunity to obtain the benefits of 
traceability; therefore size is positively related to adoption. Other factors may influence 
traceability adoption. The literature on introduction of new technologies suggests that 
younger and more educated farmers are more likely to adopt. Farmers already involved in 
quality assurance schemes, such as those associated with Protected Designations of 
Origin products, may be more inclined to adopt traceability as they have already had to 
establish registries and comply with certification. Finally, sales to more profitable 
markets, such as to retailers affiliated with EurepGAP, is hypothesized to increases the 
probability of traceability adoption. 
The first order condition for the farmer’s problem shows that the decision to 
implement traceability depends upon marginal increments of profitability, premiums, 
costs, and on farm size. From this condition, the discrete choice empirical model can be 
defined as: 
*
i i i i X γ β ε = +                  (3) 
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where 
*
i γ  is an unobservable level of the traceability variable chosen by the i
th farm, 
while  i γ is the observable binary choice of the type of traceability scheme. When this 
variable takes the value of 1, the farm chooses a higher level of traceability, for example 
that required by EurepGAP. Otherwise, the farm chooses the minimum level of 
traceability necessary to remain in the market. Xi is a row vector of exogenous variables 
affecting the farmer's choice, βi is a column vector of unknown coefficients, and εi is a 
farm specific error term. The vector of exogenous factors includes: farmer's age and 
education level, size of the farm, farm production and productivity, farm location, 
affiliation to a farmer organization, type of farmer, and whether the farmer sells to the 
export and/or domestic markets. Following Maddala, the empirical model is specified as: 
i i i i
i
Prob( =1)= Prob( >-X )
                  = 1-F(-X )
γ ε β
β
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               (6) 
This specification can be used with survey data to test the hypotheses suggested above to 
determine what affects the probability of implementing traceability in the case study 
industry. 
The Portuguese Pear Industry 
The Portuguese pear industry provides an interesting case study of traceability 
adoption for several reasons. The Western central region of Portugal is a costal area of  12 
about 2000 square kilometers located between the cities of Lisbon and Leiria. This region 
produces 80% of the total Portuguese pear production, which varies between 100,000 and 
200,000 tons a year (Silva et al.). About one fifth of the annual crop is exported, mainly 
to European countries, Canada, and Brasil. The local pear is the Rocha variety, which is 
currently the 3
rd most exported variety in the world. It was recognized as a Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) by the European Union in the 1995. Producers selling under 
this regional label have since adopted quality assurance and certification schemes. On 
average, producers in this region have exported about 15% of total production to United 
Kingdom supermarket channels (Soares, Silva, and Alexandre). British retailers have 
been imposing EurepGAP accreditation on the producers and processing facilities in this 
region since 2001, leading to traceability adoption by those who want to keep their 
contracts. Farmers and their organizations were asked to upgrade the traceability system 
already in place to comply with integrated crop protection and production schemes, 
improve environmental practices related to usage and storing of agro-chemicals, and 
assure proper working conditions for rural workers (the social dimension of EurepGAP). 
Production in this region is organized in several types of cooperatives, exporting 
companies, and other types of organizations. The farmer organizations in this region are 
recognized as being among the more professionalized in Portugal. 
British supermarkets associated with EurepGAP have long being purchasing fruit 
in the area. About 30 percent of the annual crop from several different pear processing 
facilities in Portugal is sold to these supermarkets. They offer an annual contract for fruit 
supply to Portuguese farmer organizations. In turn these organizations contract with their  13 
affiliated pear orchards. Firms not willing to be certified under this scheme risk losing 
access to the profitable British market.  
Survey Methodology and Data 
To analyze what impacts traceability adoption in the Portuguese pear industry we 
contacted Portuguese researchers and, in a field trip to Portugal, identified a group of 
seven pear producers organizations in the western region north of Lisbon that have 
implemented traceability systems from the farm to supermarkets. In our contacts, we 
found that traceability is always associated with some sort of assurance or regulatory 
scheme. Typically, its adoption is not an initiative of farmers; rather it is a response to 
changes in market or regulatory conditions. Hence it is not possible to decouple 
traceability adoption from other forms of quality differentiation strategies. 
In the case study region there are three categories of farmers regarding traceability 
adoption: those that have not yet adopted it, those who adopted it to the degree necessary 
to comply with integrated crop management regulations, and those who comply with 
EurepGAP requirements. Recall, that traceability is the first major must control points of 
this quality standard. Other major musts are closely related to the practices of integrated 
crop management; additionally there must be registries on how pesticides and herbicides 
are stored, water use, and conditions for workers. Thus we can assume that the system of 
registries at the farm level, which is the base of traceability, is more stringent under 
EurepGAP than is required to comply with integrated management regulations.  
To obtain the data we first contacted the directors of seven marketing oriented 
farmer organizations by phone, asking them for information on types of traceability  14 
systems implemented and whether they would participate in a survey. Additionally, we 
contacted the Associação Nacional de Produtores de Pêra Rocha, which is the 
organization managing the PDO Pêra Rocha do Oeste, asking for their collaboration in 
data collection. Then an email questionnaire was sent to the directors of all these 
organizations during the month of April 2006. Each was asked to gather a random sample 
of farmers affiliated to his organization and, for each of these, answer a questionnaire 
designed to obtain information on the type of traceability system implemented, 
characteristics of the farm and farmer, location, and markets to which production was 
sold. A translation of the instrument is available upon request. All the variables in the 
survey were binomial or categorical. To increase the response rate, we did not include 
direct measures of monetary costs and benefits of traceability to farmers. We obtained 
data from 6 of the 8 organizations contacted; the sample totals 140 observations, however 
due to missing data not all could be used in the analysis. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on each of the variables in the survey. In order 
to estimate the Logit model we first separated the categorical data into dummy variables. 
Even though our dependent variable (TRACESIS) was designed to have three categories, 
thus permitting a multinomial Logit analysis, it was not possible to obtain observations 
on farmers who did not implement traceability. Hence, the comparison is between 
EurepGAP traceability adoption (36.43% of the observations) and the benchmark of a 
regulatory traceability scheme linked to integrated crop management. 
The variable CENTRAL indicates to which of the six producer organization the 
farmer is associated. For the analysis, the six organizations were grouped into a binomial  15 
variable. One group includes the larger organizations of Frutus, CoopVal, and Frutoeste; 
they were the first to adopt EurepGAP. The other three smaller and later adopting 
organizations, Ecofrutas, Cooperfrutas, and Eurohorta, were also grouped together. AGE 
indicates the age group of the farmer or manager; the data was collected in five categories 
that were then merged into 4 dummy variables. EDUCATION captures the schooling 
level and leads to 2 dummy variables. TONHAPE measures the productivity of the pear 
orchard in tones per hectare, three dummy variables where derived from this variable. 
UKSALES is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the producer sells pears to British 
supermarkets. Finally, since 4 municipalities in this region account for over 60% of the 
total national pear production, the variable MUNICIP was recoded as a dichotomous 
variable taking the value 1 if the farm is located in one of the top four municipalities. 
We use reduced form indicators to capture the effect of different factors on the 
type of traceability system adopted. The literature reviewed and preliminary results from 
a study being carried out in the region by Pinto and Fragata suggest that productivity, 
compliance with an existing quality assurance system, and fragmentation of farmland are 
proxies for the costs of implementing traceability. For orchards of the same size, a more 
productive farm will have higher production volume, need more registry activity, and 
have higher traceability costs. As Mora and Menozzi pose, having complied with some 
type of quality assurance system facilitates implementation of traceability. In this region 
producers may be meeting PDO standards and thus would have a lower cost of 
traceability adoption. Hence, we hypothesize that the dummy variables TONHA2 and 
TONHA3 (derived from the variable TONHAPE) will decrease the odds of traceability  16 
implementation, while PEARPDO, an indicator of prior quality assurance activity, will 
increase them. We could not obtain information on the number of parcels held by each 
farm so this proxy for traceability costs is not included in the analysis. Using these 
exogenous variables, we estimated a set of models using the logistic procedure in SAS. 
Factors Affecting Traceability Adoption in the Portuguese Pear Industry 
Table 3 reports the results of the analysis of maximum likelihood estimates for the full 
model of traceability choice, using all the exogenous variables described in the previous 
section. The matrix of correlations did not show evidence of multi-collinearity between 
the independent variables of the model. However, in estimating this model we were 
confronted with a problem of quasi-complete separation of data points. This is a sign of 
convergence failure, in which case the maximum likelihood estimate may not exist 
(Allison). Quasi-complete separation issues occur in logistic regression estimation when 
samples are small, the explanatory variables perfectly or nearly perfectly predict the 
values of the endogenous variable, and when there is multi-collinearity. Typically the 
maximum likelihood estimator algorithm does not converge, and what is reported is the 
last iteration before the process stops. The coefficients reported have the correct signs and 
magnitudes; however inferences should be avoided as the significance tests are incorrect 
(SAS). To diagnose what independent variable is causing the problem, Allison suggests 
checking for covariates with large coefficients and standard errors. An immediate remedy 
is to estimate the model without the culprit variables; however this may cause biases 
because what causes the problem is that these covariates are too good. A prescribed  17 
alternative is to report the results of the non-converged solution with an infinity symbol 
for each variable causing the problem (Allison). 
The full model has a good and significant fit (-2LL is 86.31) at the 1% level. The 
predictive power is also very good (R
2 of 68%). We do not report the Wald chi-square 
significance tests for the parameter estimates because they are not reliable when there is 
quasi-complete separation of data points (SAS). Table 3 shows that the signs of 
PEARPDO, PEARAREA2, TONHA2, and TONHA3 conform with our hypotheses. 
Following Allison, the estimates for the variable UKSALES are reported with an infinity 
symbol, indicating that it perfectly predicts the observations of the dependent variable 
and indicating that it is the variable causing the quasi-complete separation problem. This 
should not be surprising, since EurepGAP certification is only imposed on farms that 
want to continue to sell to the UK supermarkets. Table 4, reports the cross frequencies 
between the dependent variable TRACESIS and the exogenous UKSALES. The cell 
corresponding to no sales to the UK and EurepGAP traceability has zero observations. 
The results shown in table 3 indicate that the choice of the traceability level by a 
farmer in this region cannot be separated from the choice of the market where sales 
occur. Hence, the problem of the farmer can be decoupled into a two step decision 
process: first the farmer (or the organization to which he or she is affiliated) chooses 
whether to enter into contracts with British supermarket chains. Second, the farmer 
decides on the type of traceability to implement. An empirical strategy to model this 
decision process is to use a nested Logit model as described by Maddala. Here we use an 
alternative approach that first models the choice of sales to the UK by regressing the  18 
binomial variable UKSALES on the set of exogenous variables used in the estimation of 
model 1. This is model 2 reported in table 5; it uses the complete set of observations 
excluding those with missing values. In a second step, we model the choice of traceability 
system (TRACESIS) adopted by the subset of 89 out of 140 farmers selling to the UK, 
using the same set of exogenous variables. The results are reported as model 3 in table 5. 
The results show that both models have a good fit, as shown by the likelihood 
ratio statistic (-2LL) and at least one of the parameters is significantly different from zero 
at the 1% significance level. The predictive power of both models is quite good for Logit 
models, as the adjusted R
2 statistic is .63 for model 2 and .44 for model 3. 
The model 2 results suggest that the odds that a farmer sells to the UK market 
increase with farm size, if the farm sells pears under a PDO label, and if the farmer is 
associated with one of the larger producer organizations. The model 3 results support the 
hypotheses formed from theoretical model. The coefficients on PEARPDO and 
PEARAREA2, which capture the effects of using a quality assurance system and having 
a larger farm, are positive, increasing odds of adopting EurepGAP traceability by 13.34 
and 1.53 times. Also as hypothesized the more productive a farm is the lower are the odds 
of EurepGAP traceability adoption. More productive farms have to do more registries 
and therefore have higher traceability costs. Other factors that increase the odds of 
adopting EurepGAP traceability are: being a full time producer (increases odds 6.77 
times) and affiliation with one of the larger producer organizations (increases odds 5.00 
times). Farmers who are 36 to 45 and from 56 to 65 years old have a higher propensity to  19 
adopt EurepGAP traceability. The level of education seems to have a very small effect on 
the odds of adopting more demanding traceability systems. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
We analyzed traceability adoption at the farm level in the Portuguese Pear 
Industry using discrete choice models. We gathered data on farm’s and farmers 
characteristics from six producer’s organizations from the western region of Portugal, 
which is the leading pear producing area in the country. Since, 2001 farmers in this 
region were asked to upgrade their traceability and comply with EurepGAP quality 
assurance system. Traceability should be seen as a complement or as an integrate 
component of quality assurance systems. Our research and interviews with farmer’s 
organizations indicate that it does not make economic or technical sense to implement 
traceability if the farmer is not yet complying with some quality standard. Traceability 
may not stand alone. 
The main results are based on a sub-sample of the original dataset, composed only 
by those pear producers exporting to the UK. We provide evidence for our theoretical 
hypothesis that the size of the farm and previous compliance with a quality assurance 
system increase the probability of adoption of more stringent traceability systems, while 
farms with higher productivity have lower odds of adoption.  
This study has important policy implications. First, it shows that there may be 
complementarities between mandatory and voluntary traceability systems. Second, if 
firms with market power are required to implement traceability systems, they can use 
their influence to force their partners in the supply chain to implement more stringent  20 
traceability systems. Finally, if public authorities and managers of farmer’s organization 
want to improve the number of farmers adopting traceability they should concentrate 
their efforts on helping smaller and more productive farmers. 
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Table 2   Descriptive statistics of farm characteristics and farmer demographics for the 
sample 
 
Variable  Value  Valid 
Percent 
Variable  Value  Valid 
Percent 
Frutus  21.43  <10 
ton/ha 
10.22 
Ecofrutas  10.71  11-15 
ton/ha 
40.15 
CoopVal  21.43  16-20 
ton/ha 
39.42 
Frutoeste   21.43 
TONHAPE 






24.29  <100 ton  64.23 
CENTRAL  
   





>101 ton  35.77 
Full time 
 
80.00  Yes  64.49  PRODTYPE  





No  35.51 
25-35 
 





Others  21.43 
46-55 
 
21.90  < 5 ha  54.29 
56-65 
 
36.50  6-15 ha  36.43 
AGE 
   





> 16 ha  9.29 
Middle School 
 





No  13.57 
EDUCATION  
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Table 3  Logistic regression estimates for EurepGAP adoption 
  Model 1 
(N=138) 


































































aOdds ratio.   27 
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Table 5  Logistic regression estimates for Sales to the UK (Model 2) and EurepGAP 
adoption (Model 3) 
 
































































































-2LL  96.25***  86.31*** 
Pseudo R
2  .63  .44 
aOdds ratio. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 